The Woyane regime in Ethiopia finds itself trapped in the contradictions arising from the dichotomy between its democratic posturing to appease its western donors on the one hand, and the necessity to rely on brute force to sustain a very untenable status quo. Two epochal reforms essentially relating to land and language introduced by Ethiopian regimes, and purportedly aimed at addressing the devastation wrought on the lives of Oromos as a result of a century of Ethiopian imperial rule, turned out be a strategy designed for appeasement in order to ensure their continued loyalty to the Ethiopian state. Indeed even the partial tackling of those two crucial issues dear to Oromos, did achieve its intended purpose of inducing euphoria. But it also inevitably eroded the social fabric of the Ethiopian empire.
So when the Woyane staged those `free and fair’ elections for their western donors, the Amhara, who had relinquished supremacy to the Tigreans following the fall of Menigstu’s dictatorship, were presented with a window for a come back.
Having regrouped under the very fragile umbrella of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), they clearly saw the moment as a golden opportunity to launch a renewal of their fading empire. The CUD, essentially an assortment of Amhara parties, is an organization, unlike most other Habasha groups, with little pretensions or pandering to Oromo interests or those of other nationalities in Ethiopia, hardly ever recognizing their very existence. The CUD’s sole mission is to resuscitate the dying empire and bring back the darker days for Oromos i.e., take away their land under different ploys, extinguish their budding language, erase Oromia from the political map…etc.
Both the Dergue and the Woyane laid claim to legitimacy on the platform of reform and progress for all their worth. Each emerged, necessarily, as an antithesis to its predecessor, portraying itself as progressive and accommodative of Oromos and their interests and indeed of other oppressed nations in Ethiopia. Each had done something and promised plenty, until it fully consolidated power, that is. Not that it would make much difference as far as the Oromo struggle is concerned, but the CUD is not capable of even such make- believe. It has come out unabashedly as a party standing solely for the restitution of the Ethiopian empire.
As part of their campaign to reinstate the old order under a new democratic garb, Habasha politicians and priests alike have found it necessary to continue with their psychological warfare of lies and hatred about Oromos. We recall that Orthodox clerics, the empire’s traditional cadre’s, once preached from their pulpits the prohibition of the Qubee, Oromo alphabet, alleging that it was demonic. When that failed miserably with the expansion of the Oromo language, they had to change tack. They have gone to the ludicrous extent of telling their followers to boycott the consumption of coffee under the pretext that that too is unholy. The purpose behind this campaign waged by these people, with a medieval mindset, is of course to cripple Oromia’s economy. But in their ignorance borne out of malice they have no grasp of the consequence of their hatred on the economy of their “beloved” Ethiopia, which of course is primarily dependent on the very commodity they have been reviling, i.e. coffee.
One might wonder here how the CUD from such a reactionary political platform would propose to consolidate power in Oromia beyond the confines of Finfinne and other urban centers in the event they emerge victorious let alone establish stability and the mechanism for governance short of resurrecting Mengistu’s notorious coercive machinery. It would be very naïve on their part, to say the least, although not inconceivable, to bank on the viability of a surrogate Oromo group, their version of OPDO, for success in Oromia with the political agenda they have put on the table. In the event they succeeded to supplant the Woyane, they would likely be confined to the urban centers, with no better vision to resolve Ethiopia’s chronic and multi-faceted problems; if anything, they are part of the problem rather than the solution.
In retrospect, those mass revolts the CUD mustered against the Woyane regime seem to have been motivated more by a bid for power- sharing than an all- out insurrection to wrench away power from the Woyne as such. Power- sharing would be a more attractive option as it would guarantee the CUD the capability to refashion the constitution in their image unencumbered by the impossible task of governing today’s Ethiopia. But it shouldn’t have been lost on them of all people, when they embarked on the path of mass protests that Habshas bargain the way they know best, that is through the barrel of the gun. Apart from this acute awareness of their inability to govern, there remains a nagging suspicion among Oromos that the Amhara may even be inhibited at least momentarily, to leave power in the hands of the Woyane for fear of the Oromo “threat”, or really their ghosts. But there is no doubt the CUD have clearly set in motion a process that has the potential of running out of control leading to a situation of civil strife. Although the Woyane seem to have come out on top for the moment, it is clear that antagonisms have only gotten worse and the situation remains volatile with all the potential for flare-ups.
The so-called elections, which in the absence of genuine Oromo organizations like the OLF became a contest essentially between the EPRDF and the CUD, could only serve to give those parties a false sense of electoral strength and indeed invincibility as far as their showing in Oromia is concerned. There was much talk among some Habasha circles in the days leading to those elections of a “green’’ revolution in Ethiopia in the genre of Ukraine’s, or of Georgia’s…etc. But that such discourse conveniently ignored the significant disparity in the social structures of those countries on the one hand and Ethiopia on the other has been obviated by the bloody outcome of the upheavals in Finfinne. Above all the aftermath of those events have shown what is perhaps the single most significant factor accounting for the survival of Meles’ regime - external, more particularly western support. Western support for a bloody dictator like Meles may have saved him the day, but there is no doubt that it would be detrimental to stability and the development of democracy in Ethiopia, for all anybody cares, and will hurt rather than help western interests in the long term.
Furthermore, elections within the framework of a state of Ethiopia’s historical constitution are capable of producing only monstrous distortions the likes of which we have recently witnessed. Rather than address and redress long standing issues like ours they seem to have deepened the ethnic and social divisions, widened the rural/urban dichotomy, resulting in the polarization of society as a whole. It is only our hope that the kind of balkanization produced by the elections will not be the telltale signs of Oromia’s future political contours. The results have only fueled the traditional rivalry between the Habasha elites, the Amhara vis-à-vis the Tigreans, over the control of Oromia. They point to the need for the two components of the Ethiopian polity - the Amhara and the Tigreans, who are also the empire’s problem children - to settle the question of power within their respective communities and try to introduce a modicum of democracy before they even venture into the democratization of Ethiopia. It is not Oromos who are found wanting in terms of Ethiopian democratization as some Shane (aka The Asmara Group)
leaders imply in their rhetoric; Oromos are products of the great democratic Gada political culture. The onus rests squarely with the Habasha to transform their own societies first. And in the event that they seek help in this area, it would be proper for the Shane to dispense.
This is a defining moment for Oromos. The inescapable truth is that the Oromo leadership is divided, but our hope is Oromos will close ranks and remain united for their liberation. For Oromos, the one thing revealed by those elections was the OLF’s diminished relevance in Oromo politics on the ground. It is not clear what role this chief Oromo organization intended to play by way of influencing the course and outcome of the elections in favor of the struggle short of open participation, which did not happen for obvious reasons. There is no doubt that active non-participation i.e., a boycott by Oromos would have gone a long way in terms of discrediting the results if not nullify them. We have gone missing on the ground, a fact that cannot go unnoticed by friend and foe alike. It was disheartening for most Oromos to observe helplessly as their enemies were encroaching with impunity on what should be their safe electoral turf, rural Oromia.
And that is where the service of Oromo leadership is badly needed, not necessarily in Finfinne. To give the devil its due, the CUD have led their campaign in the midst of their constituency, a fact that has lent them a modicum of credibility both at home and abroad. We know the Oromo leadership, unlike the CUD, was not allowed to operate legally, but then Oromia is not Finfinne alone. Instead, some Oromos, notably the Shane, seem to insist on rejoining the Woyane hoping for a respectable accommodation. They tell us that they are seeking a political settlement to the Oromo question via the democratization route but can persuade neither their constituency nor Meles why this change of course is a viable option.
Embroiled, as he is, in his worst political crisis yet, it would seem to be the rational thing to do for Meles to heed the counsel of his western backers and make some small concessions to the opposition and particularly to the OLF and bring them back to the fold. We remember that not too long ago when Meles and the Shane were even sounding out each other publicly. It appeared Meles was prepared to play Oromos against the CUD and buy himself some more time. But his subsequent reluctance to go all the way suggests that either the OPDO may not be ready to countenance their arch-rivals back undermining their position in Oromia, or that he is still betting on reaching accommodation with the CUD, which he definitely can; either way the government’s authority has been seriously damaged and its survival is at stake. And subsequently going from the frying pan to the fire, the Shane are sending unmistakable signals intended for the other end of the political spectrum. However, they are seeking an elusive rapprochement from a position of weakness, which is an anomaly in the history of political conflicts. In our view, the necessary conditions do not yet exist, neither internally nor externally; for the Shane to pretend otherwise would point to an axe to grind or to our eternal gullibility. Oromos cannot expect to attain their freedom under the auspices of an Ethiopian regime. This is not at all an attempt at finger pointing, but rather recognition of our collective failure as a people, a point of discomfiture for all Oromos, the millions who have been looking up to the Organization for their salvation.
Banding the word “democracy” around, we so often seem to be oblivious of the fact that, genuinely exercised, the democratization of Ethiopia could set in motion a political process that could mean the end of the Ethiopian state as we know it. It would mean the end of a century of hegemony over Oromia; it would mean the end of exploitation of our resources; it would mean the loss of power and privilege; all this because democratization would serve as a means to open up vistas for us to freely organize our parties, conduct truly democratic elections and eventually decide what type of political compact we would want to have vis-à-vis the rest of the peoples in the country. Theoretically, democracy could open up the option for Oromos of forming their own independent state. One has to wonder sometimes why this glaring fact seems lost on the Shane while the Habasha in their unflinching resistance to democracy realize fully well that that is precisely what would be in store for them via the democratization route. It’s no surprise therefore that all the major Habasha political players and parties that aspire to supplant the Woyane have fundamentally the same perverted vision of democracy - a means through which to hold the crumbling empire together so as to guarantee their continued domination of Oromos. So right now Oromos have no real partners among the power elites in Ethiopia, Amhara and Tigrean alike, in this complex multi-national state to talk about democracy let alone implement it. As they say, it takes two to tango; in the case of Ethiopia, it takes at least three. Hence, in the absence of unfettered Oromo participation in the political life of the country, democracy/elections…etc would remain to be a farcical contest between the Amhara and Tigreans over the control of Oromia.
They have to talk about democracy, though, because democracy is something to be professed by Ethiopian regimes to obtain loans and development assistance from the World Bank and western donors, and never to be practiced. But the very discrepancy arising from the so-called elections has thrust the Woyane into a quagmire and it is difficult to see a way out for them without making significant concessions, unlikely given their desperate insecurity arising from their minority status. The other option is of course hanging on through brute force, which they have succeeded to do thus far. However, they of all people should know the very limits of such actions.
So under these circumstances Oromos should pull themselves together and stand on their own feet, realizing that their deliverance lies in their unity and solidarity for Oromo liberation. Oromos need to stick to their goal of liberation and regroup under this very objective regardless of region, religion or political affiliation. Oromo political forces should also utilize this moment to pull together under the banner of liberation and confront the chauvinistic Habasha groups. Outraged by the state of paralysis of the Oromo Movement overall, a lot of Oromos seem to see the pressing need to broaden its base for a more effective struggle. That is the only way Oromos can stand in front of the coalescing of Habasha political forces, which despite their unwieldy character, are held together by their unrelenting opposition to Oromo self-determination. The Shane should realize that the Habasha would eventually talk to Oromos but just not yet. Applying pressure, not pleading would pave the path for dialogue.
They should also realize that the Oromo struggle proceeds according to its own paradigm and agenda and not to be induced by the actions of the CUD or some other party. Oromos are not mimicking the CUD or anybody else with regard to the evolving situation in Ethiopia precisely because we have radically different agenda as well as operating in different social milieu; the logic of our struggle derives from our historical circumstances as well as our present environment. Thus the Shane should resist the temptation of calling for Oromo mass actions willy-nilly only because the CUD did so in Fanzine. It is morally wrong and politically damaging to use the lives of Oromo children for a show of force put on for the outside world. It is by no means to suggest, of course, that Oromos should observe passively the dynamic situation in Ethiopia. We should exploit it judiciously and in the context of advancing the long-term struggle among the masses of the Oromo people. Such spontaneity would harm the struggle rather than help advance it. Oromo leaders are mistaken if they are jockeying for power against the Hailu Shauls to replace Meles Zenawi under the status quo. Neither is the Oromo struggle about securing high positions for individuals in the Ethiopian bureaucracy. We all know that route has not taken us anywhere.
The Shane leaders would lose not only the trust of their people if they continued on this path of capitulation; they would also lose the respect of the international community. They should expect nothing better than contempt even from the enemy. They should take personal ambition out of the political equation and lead the Oromo people on the original path of true liberation in order to regain our trust and confidence.
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